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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GARY MATHIE 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TWILA GOUGH, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 981452CA 
Civil No. 944701877 
f
 Priority 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the granting of permanent physical custody of the parties' 
minor child to the Defendant in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, 
State of Utah, on January 31, 1997, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
Appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the issues and standard of appellate 
review presented by Appellant. The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by giving undue significance to the fact that 
1 
Respondent was granted temporary custody of the minor child during the pendency of the 
divorce proceeding? 
Standard of appellate review: Trial court judges are accorded broad discretion in 
determining permanent physical custody of a minor child. "Only where the trial court's 
judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion, will an appellate court 
inteipose its own judgment." Shioii v. Shioii 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in weighing the Appellant's prior criminal 
history against when the criminal incidents occurred before the child was born? 
Standard of appellate review: Trial court judges are accorded broad discretion in 
determining permanent physical custody of a minor child. "Only where the trial court's 
judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion, will an appellate court 
inteipose its own judgment." Shioii v. Shioii 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no statutory provisions directly related to the issues at hand. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A minor child was born to the parties out of wedlock on June 4, 1994, to wit: 
McKinlee Marie Mathie. (R. at 2). The parties have never been married, and have never 
resided together. (R. at 204, p. 30). The minor child has been continuously in the physical 
custody of the Respondent since the child's birth. (R. at 204, p. 105). 
Because the Respondent is a single parent, it was necessary for her to return to work 
to support the minor child a few months after the minor child was born. (R. at 204, pp. 105-
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106). While Respondent worked, Petitioner babysat the child approximately two days per 
week from August of 1994 through November of 1994. (R. at 204, p. 106). The parties 
broke off their relationship in November of 1994. (R. at 204, p. 107). 
In order to obtain an order of paternity and visitation in regard to the minor child, the 
Petitioner filed a paternity action on December 21, 1994 and an Order to Show Cause 
hearing was held in January of 1995. (R. at 1-7; 9-16). At that time, the Respondent was 
awarded full custody of the minor child and Petitioner was granted graduated visitation with 
the minor child for the succeeding 90-day period. (R. at 20-22). 
In March of 1995, with the court's permission, the mother and child moved to Idaho 
to provide more financial and emotional stability for the minor child. (R. at 44-50). The 
Respondent's family lives in Idaho and is able to provide financial and emotional support to 
the Respondent and the minor child. (R. at 204, p. 108). Due to continuing problems with 
visitation, several Order To Show Cause hearings were held during the pendency of the 
divorce action. (R. at 72). Trial was held on November 22, 1996 and January 31, 1997. 
(R. at 204). At trial, Appellant testified to many alcohol and past criminal offenses (R. at 
204, pp. 65-70). The trial court issued its findings of fact on January 31. 1997, analyzing 
seven factors. (R. at 204, pp. 228-235). The trial court found that both parties were 
relatively equal as far as stability, suitable environment, bonding with the child, and 
commitment to care for the child and relative parenting skills. The court further found that 
the ability and willingness to provide visitation clearly favored the Petitioner, but that the 
Respondent's character was more favorable in relation to the child's best interest. (R. at 204, 
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p. 230). The court also found it to be in the best interests of the minor child to maintain the 
Respondent's primary custodial relationship. (R. at 204, p. 232). Because the factors in 
Respondent's favor outweighed the factor's in Petitioner's favor, Respondent was awarded 
permanent custody of the minor child. (R. at 204, p. 235). 
The court found the character and emotional stability of the Respondent to be 
lacking due to five alcohol related offenses, one theft charge, and a criminal trespass, which 
the court found to be indicative of the visitation disputes between the parties. (R. at 204, p. 
231). The court considered the fact that the Petitioner brought an indecent calendar with 
partially-clothed women to court which he had hanging in his kitchen, as lacking in 
sensitivity on the part of the Petitioner. (R. at 204, p. 231). The court also considered the 
fact that Petitioner thought it was O.K. to have such a calendar because his girlfriend who 
was pictured in the calendar gave it to him, as indicative of his character and lifestyle, which 
factors went against awarding Petitioner custody in bringing up a young lady. (R. at 204, p. 
231). 
The other factor the trial court found in the Petitioner's favor was that it would be in 
the child's best interest to maintain the Respondent's primary custodial relationship with the 
child. (R. at 204, p. 234) The trial court duly noted and weighed the fact that the petitioner 
had provided significant amounts of caretaking to the minor child in awarding liberal 
visitation to the Petitioner. (R. at 204, p. 235). 
Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to file his notice of appeal and the Notice 
of Appeal was filed on August 5, 1998. (R. at 197-198.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly weighed the effects of the temporary custody order and 
the Petitioner's prior criminal history in awarding permanent custody of the minor child to 
the Respondent. This Court has emphatically stated, "Only where trial court action is so 
flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion should the appellate fomm interpose 
its own judgment." Wall v. Wall 700 P.2d 1124, 1125 (Utah 1985). In order to show a 
flagrant abuse of discretion, the Appellant must show that the findings of fact were 
inadequate to support the custody award, are not supported by the evidence, or that the trial 
court erred in law in determining custody.1 
In the findings of fact presented in the case at hand, the trial court set forth seven 
factors supporting the permanent custody award to the Respondent. All seven factors were 
clearly supported by the evidence presented at trial. All seven factors are pursuant to the 
legal standards in determining custody which the Supreme Court has set, focusing on the best 
interest of the child and utilizing the suggested factors in determining custody found in the 
Utah Supreme Court decision, Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). Further, 
the trial court's analysis and weight given to each factor are reasonable and fully explained 
in its findings of fact. 
Appellant specifically contends that undue weight was given to a temporary custody 
order in awarding permanent custody of the minor child to the Respondent pending the two 
'See Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996); See also Paryzek v. Parvzek 
776 P.2d 78 (Utah 1989). 
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and a half years prior to the trial. Utah case law clearly indicates that if a temporary custody 
period before the trial was lengthy, the factor of temporary custody becomes of greater 
importance in determining permanent custody. Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah 
1989). In the case at hand, the child had been in the physical custody of the Respondent 
since the child's birth and was happy and well-adjusted in Respondent's care. Further, the 
court found that the child had lived much more with the mother than the father and that it 
was in the child's best interest to maintain the stability of the primary custodial bond. 
Because no custody evaluation was performed, all other factors being equal, the court 
properly found that the child's interests would be best promoted by maintaining the prior, 
stable and healthy custodial relationship with the Respondent. 
Appellant further contends that undue weight was given to the fact that Petitioner 
committed five alcohol-related offenses prior to the birth of the child. Again, Utah law 
clearly states that in determining custody, the trial court "shall consider the best interests of 
the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. . ." 
(Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10, emphasis added). At trial, the Respondent admitted to alcohol-
related offenses in 1985, 1986, 1989, 1992, and 1994, which the court allowed as evidence 
to show a pattern in the Respondent's character. The court, noting that Respondent had 
committed the alcohol-related offenses prior to the birth of the child, also noted that 
character does not change overnight with the birth of a child. In determining Respondent's 
character, the court also considered the fact that the Respondent brought his kitchen calendar 
portraying semi-nude women to court. As further evidence of the Petitioner's character, the 
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court considered the continuing problems between the parties regarding visitation. In light 
of the fact that the Respondent has no criminal record of any kind, the court did not abuse 
its discretion by finding the factor of character in favor of the Respondent. It was reasonable 
and proper for the court to find in favor of the Respondent in determining custody, 
considering Petitioner's prior alcohol-related offenses combined with the Petitioner's present 
lack of judgment and lack of sensitivity to the best interests of the minor child. 
Finally, the trial court's decision should not be disturbed because the trial court was 
in the best position to look at the totality of the circumstances in making the custody 
decision. This Court has stated that "A determination of the 'best interests of the child' 
frequently turns on numerous factors which the trial court is best suited to assess, given its 
proximity to the parties and the circumstances." Wall at 1125. By Personally observing the 
parties, the trial court was able to assess the parties' true characters, and make the proper 
decision regarding the best interest of the minor child. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY WEIGHED THE EFFECT OF THE 
TEMPORARY CUSTODY ORDER IN DETERMINING THE BEST INTEREST 
OF THE CHILD AND IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD TO 
THE RESPONDENT. 
In the landmark case, Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), the Supreme 
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Court of Utah stated that a custody award should be determined solely by reference to the 
best interests of the child. Id. at 40. The Court further stated that some factors the trial court 
may consider in determining the child's best interest are as follows: 
The preference of the child; keeping siblings together, the 
relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the 
prospective custodians; and, in appropriate cases, the general 
interest in continuing previously determined custody 
arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted. Other 
factors relate primarily to the prospective custodians' character 
or status or to their capacity or willingness to function as 
parents: moral character and emotional stability-, duration and 
depth of desire for custody; ability to provide personal rather 
than surrogate care; significant impairment of ability to function 
as a parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other 
cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; 
religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including, in 
extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and financial 
condition. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Appellant contends that the trial court improperly weighed the previously determined 
custody arrangement. However, it is clear from the court's statement in Hutchison that an 
appropriate factor to consider when determining permanent custody is the temporary custody 
arrangement. The question then becomes whether the trial court blatantly abused its 
discretion by giving the previously determined custody arrangement too much weight. 
Appellant cites Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996), which states that 
temporary orders should not be treated as permanent custody orders which require a 
substantial and material change of circumstance to modify. However, Appellant failed to cite 
the rest of the opinion which states, 
This is not to say that the environment in which a child has 
lived prior to the final custody hearing should be ignored in 
determining initial custody. As long as the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, it was entitled to accord no more or less 
significance to the existing custody arrangement than it deemed 
appropriate. 
Id. at 1215. 
In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically held in Parvzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 
78 (Utah 1989), that the trial court erred in explicitly disregarding the fact that the minor 
child had resided with one of the parents for two and one-half years prior to trial on a 
temporary custody award. The Court further held that a trial court must examine a child's 
need for stability, and therefore, consider prior custody arrangements, including the duration 
of those arrangements, and the potential harm to the child if the arrangement is changed. Id. 
at 82. 
The next question regarding how much weight should be given to the temporary 
custody arrangement is also addressed by the Court in Paryzek: 
What particular weight to be accorded those factors in a given 
case must depend on the duration of the initial custody 
arrangement . . . A very short custody arrangement of a few 
months, even if nurturing to some extent, is not entitled to as 
much weight as a similar arrangement of substantial duration . 
.. Because of the length of time of the temporary custody, that 
factor becomes one of relatively greater importance in 
determining permanent custody . . . This was a close case . . . 
Where the call is a close one, we believe the child's interests 
will best be promoted by maintaining the prior, stable and 
healthy arrangement. That is, where the evidence was otherwise 
inconclusive . . the paramount consideration of stability tips in 
[that parent's] favor and warrants awarding custody to [that 
parent]. 
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Id. at 82-83.2 
Thus, because of the length of the temporary custody order, greater weight should 
have been given to that factor. The courts try to avoid "ping-ponging" the child from one 
parent to the other unless there are specific findings showing that it would be in the child's 
best interest. The evidence at trial showed that the minor child was thriving as a normal 
child in the Respondent's care and custody. Therefore, the court properly found that it 
would be in the best interest of the child to continue the stability of this thriving custodial 
relationship. 
POINT II, 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY WEIGHED THE PETITIONER'S PRIOR 
CRIMINAL HISTORY IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD TO 
THE RESPONDENT. 
In addition to the Hutchison factors, Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code states in 
determining custody, the court "shall consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties." In a Utah Court of 
Appeals case, Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1987), evidence of respondent's 
convictions for money order theft, check alteration, and making a false statement on a loan 
2See also Pusev v. Pusev,750 P.2d 599 (Utah 1988)(party awarded custody did not 
act wrongly in obtaining temporary custody); Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 
1982),(in any determination of the best interests of the child, it is appropriate for the trial 
court to consider the child's present custody arrangement). 
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application were considered in determining permanent custody of the minor child.3 
In the present case, the trial court, overruling Petitioner's objections to the admission 
of evidence relating to these criminal charges, stated that the evidence would be appropriate 
to show Petitioner's pattern of behavior, although the weight the court gave those charges 
may be less considering the fact that no charges had occurred since the birth of the minor 
child. In its findings, the trial court stated that the criminal charges were indicative of 
disputes the parties were having over visitation. Appellant contends that his past criminal 
history does not affect his parenting ability; however, the court need not find one parent 
inadequate to award custody to the other. 
The court also considered Petitioner's calendar of semi-clad women, which darkened 
the Appellant's character and sensitivity to meet child's needs. "The plaintiff had the record 
and I think he's to be commended that it has changed but I still think that lifestyle character, 
it's part of his character and lifestyle. I think there has been an explanation as to the calendar 
and the concern of the calendar had to do with .. His sensitivity to those factors in relation 
to long-term, if I'm going to award custody in bringing up a long lady, sensitivity to those 
issues of having and presently those. And I think it exhibited a lack of sensitivity which 
would affect, some effect on the character of the plaintiff". (R. at 204, p. 231). 
Because character was not the only factor in determining custody and because no 
3
 See also Smith v. Smith ,725 P.2d at 425 (several of the factors used in reaching 
a custody determination that was in the best interests of the minor child included: 
appellant's history of assaultive behavior; respondent's history of criminal behavior . . . 
Each of these factors is relevant in a custody determination.) 
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custody evaluation had been performed, it was appropriate for the court to look at the 
Petitioner's criminal history. In addition to the Petitioner's prior criminal history, it was 
appropriate for the trial court to be concerned with the stability, character and sensitivity of 
person raising a minor child. The trial court did not err in weighing the effect of the 
Petitioner's criminal history because it was required to make adequate findings regarding the 
best interests of the child and past conduct and demonstrated moral character of each of the 
parents, the court found it in Respondent's favor that she had moved to Idaho 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT IS BEST SUITED TO ASSESS THE NUMEROUS 
FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 
GIVEN ITS PROXIMITY TO THE PARTIES AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THE SPECIFIC CASE. 
The standard of review in custody cases is as follows: 
Only where trial court action is so flagrantly unjust as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion should the appellate forum 
interpose its own judgment. In the instant case the evidence, 
depending upon how it is viewed, could support a custody 
award to either party. In such case, we will defer to the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Wall at 1125. 
The standard of review is so high because the Court realizes that the trial court is in 
the best position to observe the circumstances of a specific case. No one set list of factors 
concerning the best interests of the child can govern custody determinations in all cases. 
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Therefore, the Court defers to the trial court absent a flagrant abuse of discretion and allows 
trial courts to give different weight to different factors. 
The Court has stated: 
Proper findings of fact ensure that the ultimate custody award 
follows logically from and is supported by, the evidence and the 
controlling legal principles. We understand this to mean that a 
custody award must be firmly anchored on findings of fact that 
(1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include enough facts to disclose 
the process through which the ultimate conclusion is reached (3) 
indicate the process is logical and properly supported, and (4) 
are not clearly erroneous." Smith at 426 
In the case at hand, the trial court has clearly stated its findings, which are 
logically and legally based. The personal observations of the trial court regarding the 
Petitioner's character, especially in regard to the indecent calendar, which is barely 
referenced in the record, underscores the importance of the Court deferring to the trial court's 
judgment in a close case where the trial court has properly based its findings. Therefore, the 
Court should defer to the judgment of the trial court in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has stated, "So long as the discretion it exercises is within the confines of 
the legal standards we have set, and the facts and reasons for the decision are set forth fully 
in appropriate findings and conclusions, we will not disturb the resulting award." Davis v. 
Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988). 
The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the previous custody placement 
of the child and the Petitioner's previous criminal history favored the Respondent in 
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awarding permanent custody to the Respondent. It is uncontroverted law that the trial court 
not only should, but must consider the previous custody arrangement when the temporary 
period is lengthy, as in the present case. It is also clear that the trial court must consider the 
past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of the parties when considering the child's 
best interest. The Court has stated that it will defer its judgment to the trial court in close 
cases. In the case at hand, the trial court's personal observations were invaluable in 
discerning the parties' true characters, and may have been one of the determining factors in 
this case, sliding the scale "even by the slimmest of margins." 
Dated this (9 / day of April, 1999. 
Frank ^ f. Smith 
Wendy F. Fenton 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellee, 
Twila Gough (Harris) 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
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DIVORCE 30-3-10 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or 
divorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their 
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the 
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In 
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's 
desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not 
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of 
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the child, or 
has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take 
that evidence into consideration in determining whether to award custody to 
the other parent. 
(4) (a) A court may not discriminate against a parent due to a disability, as 
defined in Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a 
substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an award of 
custody. 
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding 
custody or determining whether a substantial change has occurred for the 
purpose of modifying an award of custody, the parent with a disability may 
rebut any evidence, presumption, or inference arising therefrom by 
showing that: 
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit the 
parent's ability to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the 
child at issue; or 
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, or 
other resources available to supplement the parent's ability to provide 
for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue. 
(c) Nothing in this section may be construed to apply to: 
(i) abuse, neglect, or dependency proceedings under Title 62A, 
Chapter 4a, Family Services, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts; 
or 
(ii) adoption proceedings under Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption. 
His to ry : L. 1903, ch. 82, § 1; C.L. 1907, ment, effective May 5, 1997, added Subsection 
§ 1212x; C.L. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C. (4) 
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch. Cross-References . — Disposition of prop-
122, § 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 131, § 1; erty and children, § 30-3-5 
1997, ch. 43, § 1. Removal of children from homestead, § 30-2-
Amendment No t e s . — The 1997 amend- 10 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes . — In 1997, the Utah m domestic relations cases from "plaintiff and 
legislature changed the designation of parties "defendant" to "petitioner" and "respondent " 
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